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The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was designed to examine 
implicit beliefs or attitudes. In Experiment 1, response latencies obtained from 
Irish participants on the IRAP showed a strong preference for Irish over Scot-
tish and American over African. In contrast, responses to explicit Likert mea-
sures diverged from the IRAP performance in indicating Irish equally likeable 
to Scottish and African more likeable than American. Using a similar IRAP, 
Experiment 2 showed that participants from the United States showed strong 
implicit preferences for American over Irish, Irish over Scottish, and Scottish 
over African; the explicit Likert measures again diverged from the IRAP. The 
findings provide preliminary support for the IRAP as a useful measure of im-
plicit beliefs.
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Traditional methods for assessing or measuring what people think or 
believe have typically involved self-report questionnaires, which, it has been 
argued, may be subject to a number of biases. For example, individuals may 
answer in a way they judge to be the most socially acceptable (e.g., for socially 
sensitive topics). Furthermore, individuals may not even be aware of their 
own beliefs, or if awareness does exist, they make efforts to conceal their 
views if they are deemed to be socially undesirable. As a result, increasing 
attention has been devoted to studying what are described as implicit beliefs 
or attitudes. Intense debate surrounds the nature of these implicit cognitions, 
but one of the most widely cited definitions was provided by Greenwald 
and Banaji (1995), who stated that implicit attitudes are “introspectively 
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unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate 
favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects” (p. 8). 
The study of implicit cognition has led to the development of a range of 
different experimental procedures that are designed to reveal implicit beliefs 
pertaining to a particular domain. These types of measures are believed 
to address some of the weaknesses inherent in traditional self-report or 
explicit measures. Presently, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is the most popular measure of implicit beliefs or 
attitudes. The IAT is based on the assumption that it should be easier to map 
two concepts onto a single response when those concepts are associated in 
memory than when the concepts are unrelated. In a seminal study, Greenwald 
et al. presented participants with the names of flowers (e.g., “tulip”), the 
names of insects (e.g., “beetle”), pleasant words (e.g., love), and unpleasant 
words (e.g., ugly). It was assumed that the concept of flower and the attribute 
“pleasant” are likely associated in memory, as are the concept of insect and 
the attribute “unpleasant.” The researchers further reasoned that responses 
should be faster when response keys are assigned to associated stimuli than 
when they are not. The results of the experiment supported this prediction; 
response latencies were shorter when both “flower” and “pleasant” were 
assigned to one key and “insect” and “unpleasant” were assigned to a second 
key than when unassociated stimuli were assigned to the same keys (key 1 = 
flower + unpleasant; key 2 = insect + pleasant).
Greenwald and colleagues have now published a range of studies 
showing that the IAT appears to reveal implicit attitudes that participants 
typically deny, such as racial stereotypes, when explicit measures such as 
questionnaires and open-ended interviews are used (see Nosek, Greenwald, 
& Banaji, 2006, for a review). For example, IAT research has shown that many 
participants who claimed not to hold racist attitudes nevertheless responded 
more quickly and more accurately when asked to categorize names typical 
of White persons with positive words and names typical of Black persons 
with negative words, than when asked to categorize White with negative 
and Black with positive (see Greenwald et al., 2002). This basic IAT effect 
has now been replicated many times, and it has become an increasingly 
popular method for assessing implicit attitudes and dysfunctional beliefs 
(e.g., De Houwer, 2002).
In providing a structural analysis of the IAT, De Houwer (2003a) 
argued that the test involves manipulating relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
response (S-R) compatibility.1 For present purposes we will focus only on the 
former manipulation because De Houwer also concluded that it is primarily 
responsible for the IAT effect. Relevant S-R compatibility refers to the physical 
or functional similarity between a task-relevant stimulus feature and the 
required response. During compatible trials in a traditional S-R compatibility 
task, a participant might be required to press a left key when a dot appears 
on the left and a right key when a dot appears on the right, but during 
incompatible trials the opposite performance is required: left dot = press 
right and right dot = press left. In effect, the two types of trials differ in terms 
of the level of relevant S-R compatibility, and results indicate that compatible 
trials typically produce a superior performance.
1 De Houwer also provides structural analyses of the Emotional Stroop, the Extrinsic 
Affective Simon Task, and Evaluative Priming.
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According to De Houwer (2003a), the IAT is functionally similar 
to a traditional S-R compatibility task because the level of relevant S-R 
compatibility varies across compatible and incompatible trials (i.e., compatible 
task = positive or positive vs. incompatible task = positive or negative). In 
an IAT in which flower names, insect names, positive words, and negative 
words are presented, the relevant stimulus feature is the category to which 
the presented stimulus belongs. The valence of the relevant feature of the 
stimulus is positive on some trials (flower and positive) and negative on 
others (insect and negative), and thus responses also receive an extrinsic 
valence because of the response assignments. On compatible trials (e.g., “Press 
the left key for positive words and flower names”), the response key will be 
linked with both the concept of positive and the concept of flower, and will 
therefore adopt a clearly positive extrinsic meaning. On incompatible trials, 
however, the response key will be linked with both the concept of positive 
and the concept of insect, and thus the extrinsic valence of the response 
will be unclear. The IAT thus involves switching between tasks that involve 
compatible and incompatible S-R relations.
Another implicit measure that has recently been offered also appears 
to involve manipulating relevant S-R compatibility. This measure is called 
the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Power, Hayden, Milne, & Stewart, 2006), which emerged from a 
modern behavior-analytic account of human language and cognition known 
as Relational Frame Theory (RFT: Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). The 
core postulate of RFT is that the basic units of language and cognition are 
relational, and thus the procedures that have emerged from research in 
this area tend to focus on stimulus relations and relational networks (e.g., 
Barnes-Holmes, Healy, & Hayes, 2000). Consistent with this approach, the 
IRAP focuses on stimulus relations, and structurally it could be described 
as a task that manipulates relevant relational-response (R-R), rather than 
S-R, compatibility. Within the behavior-analytic tradition, however, relations 
are defined as stimuli (Catania, 198), and thus the distinction may be more 
procedural than process based.
The IRAP is best described as a combination of the IAT and an earlier 
RFT-based procedure known as the Relational Evaluation Procedure 
(REP), which has been used to examine relational responding across 
a range of studies (Cullinan, Barnes, & Smeets, 1998; Cullinan, Barnes-
Holmes, & Smeets, 2000, 2001; O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 
2004; O’Hora, Pelaez, & Barnes-Holmes, 2005; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2002, 2004). like the REP, the IRAP involves presenting specific 
relational terms (e.g., similar, opposite, better, worse) so that the properties 
of the relations among the relevant stimuli can be assessed. And similar 
to the IAT, the IRAP involves asking participants to respond quickly and 
accurately in ways that are either consistent or inconsistent with their pre-
experimentally established verbal relations. The basic hypothesis is that 
average response latencies should be shorter across blocks of consistent 
relative to inconsistent trials. Or, in other words, participants should 
respond more rapidly to relational tasks that reflect their current beliefs 
than to tasks that do not.
As stated above, like the IAT, the IRAP involves manipulating relevant 
S-R (or R-R) compatibility. That is, the IRAP requires that participants 
respond to specific stimulus relations in a manner that is either consistent 
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or inconsistent with established verbal relations. Thus, for example, a 
participant might be asked to respond True to the target statement “Mouse 
bigger than a fly” for a consistent trial, but respond False for an inconsistent 
trial. The basic assumption is that when such relational responses are made 
under time pressure, average latencies will be faster for consistent relative 
to inconsistent trials. This prediction is based on the structural similarity 
between the IAT and IRAP, in that both involve manipulating relevant S-R 
compatibility. We recognize that a prediction based on a structural analysis 
does not involve specifying the psychological processes involved in producing 
a behavioral effect, but it may help to isolate the critical independent variable 
or variables. In any case, in the General Discussion we shall consider the issue 
of psychological process, and how the RFT approach to implicit cognition 
differs from the mainstream perspective. 
More Likeable/More-Less
More Likeable
Irish Scottish
InconsistentConsistent
select ‘d’ for
True
select ‘k’ for
False
More Likeable/Less-More
More Likeable
Scottish Irish
Inconsistent Consistent
select ‘d’ for
True
select ‘k’ for
False
Less Likeable/Less-More
Less Likeable
Scottish Irish
InconsistentConsistent
select ‘d’ for
True
select ‘k’ for
False
Less Likeable/More-Less
Less Likeable
Irish Scottish
Inconsistent Consistent
select ‘d’ for
True
select ‘k’ for
False
Figure 1. Examples of the four IRAP trial types employed in Experiment 1. The sample 
(More Likeable or Less Likeable), target word pairs (Irish-Scottish, Scottish-American, 
etc.), and response options (True and False) appeared simultaneously on each trial. 
Arrows with superimposed text boxes indicate which responses were deemed consistent 
or inconsistent (boxes and arrows did not appear on-screen). Selecting the consistent 
response option during a consistent block, or the inconsistent option during an 
inconsistent block, cleared the screen for 400 ms before the next trial was presented; if 
the inconsistent option was chosen during a consistent block, or the consistent option 
during an inconsistent block, a red X appeared on-screen until the participant gave the 
alternative response.
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One of the aims of the current study was to determine if the IRAP could 
be used to identify a socially sensitive attitude that is readily predicted 
on the basis of known psychological principles but may well be hidden 
when assessed with an explicit measure. A second aim of the current 
study was to determine if the IRAP could be used to assess beliefs that 
involve comparative relations. Experiment 1 sought to test the comparative 
relations “More likeable” and “less likeable” using socially valenced target 
stimuli. On each trial of the IRAP in Experiment 1, one of the two samples 
“More likeable” and “less likeable” was presented with a target stimulus 
consisting of two words that referred to different national groups (e.g., 
Irish–Scottish, Scottish–American, American–African), and vice versa (e.g., 
Scottish–Irish). Pilot work had shown that Irish individuals, given a choice 
among Scottish, American, and African, typically rated Scottish as most 
similar to Irish, with American ranked next, followed by African. Research 
has shown that individuals generally show a preference for their own group 
over other groups (Tajfel, 1982), and that relative preferences for other 
groups are determined, in part, by the extent to which the other groups are 
perceived to be more or less similar to one’s own group (see Cota, Evans, 
Dion, Kilik, & longman, 1995; Goethals & Darley, 1977). On the basis of the 
ranking obtained in our pilot work, we predicted that Irish participants in 
the current study might show a preference for Irish over Scottish, Scottish 
over American, and American over African. 
To determine if this pattern of preferences would be obtained using an 
explicit measure, 16 Irish participants were asked to rate on four separate 
likert scales the extent to which they found Irish, Scottish, American, 
and African people likeable or unlikeable. The scales ranged from –6, 
indicating extremely unlikeable, to +6, indicating extremely likeable. The 
IRAP was then employed to determine if the participants’ implicit relative 
preferences for the four groups would differ from their explicit responses 
to the likert scales. Trials were deemed consistent or inconsistent in 
accordance with the prediction that Irish participants would show a greater 
liking for Irish over Scottish, Scottish over American, and American over 
African. For example, response latencies should be shorter when Irish 
participants have to respond “True” to “Irish more likeable than Scottish” 
and “Scottish less likeable than Irish” than when they have to respond 
“False” on these trials. Figure 1 presents examples of the four IRAP trial 
types employed in Experiment 1.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Sixteen Irish citizens (9 male and 7 female) agreed to participate in 
Experiment 1. Ages ranged from 18 to 35 years (M = 28 years). No financial 
payment or other inducements were offered for participation in the study. 
Eight participants each were assigned randomly to one of two conditions: 
consistent relations first or inconsistent relations first (the two conditions 
are described subsequently). 
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Setting
All of the experimental trials were conducted in a quiet room in the 
Department of Psychology at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 
where participants were seated comfortably and alone at a table in front of 
a personal computer. All participants completed the study on an individual 
basis. Following the instructional and practice phases of the experiment, the 
experimenter left the room and remained seated outside the door. 
Apparatus and Materials
The IRAP was presented to participants on a Pentium 4 personal 
computer. Each IRAP trial presented one of two sample stimuli: “More 
likeable” or “less likeable.” On each trial, participants were also presented 
with one of six target word pairs (see Table 1). Finally, each trial presented 
two response options: “True” and “False.”
Table 1
IRAP Stimuli in Experiment 1 
Sample 1
More Likeable
Sample 2
Less Likeable
Response option 1
True
Response option 2
False
Targets deemed consistent with 
Sample 1 
Irish   Scottish
Scottish   American
American   African
Targets deemed consistent with 
Sample 2
Scottish   Irish
American   Scottish
African   American
Four likert scales were designed to assess the participants’ explicit 
ratings of how likeable they found the four target nationalities (Irish, Scottish, 
American, and African). Each rating involved a 13-point scale that ranged from 
–6 (extremely unlikeable) to +6 (extremely likeable). For example, participants 
were asked to “Please indicate the extent to which you find American people 
to be likeable or unlikeable by circling the appropriate number.” 
Procedure
Phase 1: The explicit measure. Each participant was first presented with 
four likert scales, which asked them to rate the likeability of Irish, Scottish, 
American, and African people, respectively. Following completion of the 
scales, participants were presented with a sheet explaining that the next part 
of the study would involve a computer-based task requiring them to make 
speedy and accurate responses that might or might not correspond to their 
own beliefs.
Phase 2: The IRAP. Before participants were exposed to the IRAP tasks, 
the program presented a series of instructions that described the tasks. On 
each IRAP trial, six words appeared simultaneously on the screen. A sample 
stimulus—either “More likeable” or “less likeable”—appeared at the top, 
with a target word pair presented in the center and two response options, 
“True” and “False,” at the bottom left- and right-hand corners of the screen 
(see Figure 1). All of the stimuli remained visible until the participant pressed 
one of the response keys. The task involved choosing one of the two response 
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options (“True” or “False”). To choose the term on the left, participants 
pressed the “d” key, and to choose the term on the right, participants pressed 
the “k” key (using their left and right index fingers, respectively). Choosing 
the response option that was deemed correct for that block of trials removed 
all six stimuli from the screen for 400 ms before the next trial was presented. 
Choosing the response option that was deemed incorrect for that block of 
trials produced a red X in the middle of the screen (immediately below the 
target word pair). The participant could not proceed to the next trial until he 
or she chose the correct response option (for that block of trials). In effect, all 
key presses other than the correct one were nonfunctioning. 
All participants were exposed to eight blocks of 24 trials: two practice 
blocks followed by six test blocks. Within each block, the six target word-
pairs (Irish–Scottish, Scottish–American, and American–African, and their 
reversed counterparts; see Table 1) were presented in a random order, with 
the constraint that each word pair was presented four times, twice in the 
presence of “More likeable” and twice in the presence of “less likeable.” 
As described in the penultimate paragraph of the introduction, trials were 
deemed consistent when they were compatible with the predicted relative 
likeability of the target nationalities. That is, Irish participants should show a 
preference for Irish over Scottish, Scottish over American, and American over 
African. The reverse pattern applied to the inconsistent trials. The left–right 
position of the response options (“True” and “False”) alternated randomly 
across trials.
Consistent relations first. The following message was presented on-
screen before the participants were exposed to each practice block: “This is 
a practice—errors are expected.” The first block of trials in the consistent-
relations-first condition reinforced responses that were deemed consistent 
with the prediction that Irish participants might show a preference for 
Irish over Scottish, Scottish over American, and American over African. 
For example, given the sample “less likeable” and the target word pair 
Scottish–Irish, choosing the response option “True” immediately progressed 
the computer program to the next trial (after 400 ms). If, however, “False” 
was chosen, a red X appeared below the stimulus and the participant had 
to make the correct response by choosing “True” in order to progress to the 
next trial. 
The second block of trials reinforced responses that were deemed 
inconsistent with the predicted relative preferences. For example, given the 
sample “More likeable” and the target word pair Scottish–Irish, choosing the 
response option “True” immediately progressed the computer program to the 
next trial (after 400 ms). If, however, “False” was chosen, the red X appeared 
below the stimulus and the participant had to correct the error (choose 
“True”) to proceed. The Experimenter sat beside the participant during the 
first two practice blocks to answer any questions and to ensure that the task 
was fully understood. The experimenter then withdrew to another room for 
the remaining six blocks, which were presented in exactly the same format as 
the first two practice blocks. These test blocks alternated between consistent 
and inconsistent conditions. At no point was the participant informed which 
block was considered consistent or inconsistent.
At the end of each block, a feedback screen was presented that provided 
the percentage of correct responses and median response latency for that 
block of trials. Before each new block of trials, a message was presented 
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on-screen informing participants that in the next phase, “the previously 
correct and wrong answers are reversed.” Immediately before each of the 
six test blocks, the following text appeared on the screen: “This is a test—go 
fast; making a few errors is OK.” After completion of all eight blocks, the 
participant was thanked and appropriately debriefed. 
Inconsistent relations first. Participants in the inconsistent-relations-first 
condition were exposed to the procedures described previously, except that the 
practice and test sequences alternated from inconsistent to consistent blocks.
Results and Discussion
Explicit Likert Analyses
A mean likert rating for each of the four social groups was calculated 
across the 16 participants (Irish, M = 3.38, SE = .364; Scottish, M = 3.44, 
SE = .302; American, M = 0.13, SE = .598; African, M = 1.81, SE = .41). Irish 
and Scottish were rated as almost equally likeable, with African less likeable 
than the former two but considerably more likeable than American. The four 
ratings from each participant were entered into a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA, which yielded a significant result, F(15, 3) = 28.69, p < .0001, η
p
2 = .7. 
Post hoc Fisher’s PlSD tests indicated that the ratings for each social group 
were significantly different from each other (all ps < .0006), with the exception 
of the Irish–Scottish comparison (p = .88). This pattern of preferences was not 
consistent with the prediction made in terms of perceived group similarity, in 
that (a) Irish participants did not rate Irish as more likeable than Scottish, and 
(b) African was rated as significantly more likeable than American. Would the 
IRAP show a similar pattern of preferences?
IRAP Preliminary Analyses
The primary datum was response latency defined as the time in 
milliseconds that elapsed between the onset of the trial and a correct 
response made by the participant. For the purposes of the current study, 
responses of more than 3,000 ms were recorded as 3,000 ms, and responses 
of less than 300 ms were recorded as 300 ms (see Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003, for a detailed discussion of this and other algorithms that 
may be used for transforming response latency data generated by implicit 
measures).
To determine whether the order of testing (consistent-first vs. inconsistent-
first) or the test exposure (Test 1, Test 2, or Test 3) had a significant impact 
on the IRAP performance, we calculated the overall adjusted mean latencies 
for each of the six test blocks for each participant; the overall means and 
standard errors are presented in Table 2. Within each pair of test blocks, 
the mean response latencies were consistently shorter for the consistent 
relative to the inconsistent trials. For example, the overall mean latency for 
consistent-first participants was 2,279 ms for the first test block (consistent) 
and 2,516 ms for the second (inconsistent); for the inconsistent-first condition 
the means were 2,407 ms for the first block (inconsistent) and 2,224 ms for 
the second (consistent). 
 The mean latencies were subjected to a 2 × 2 × 3 mixed repeated 
measures ANOVA with test type (consistent vs. inconsistent) and test 
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exposure (1, 2, or 3) as repeated measures and test sequence (consistent-first 
vs. inconsistent-first) as a between-participants variable. Analyses indicated 
that the difference in latencies between consistent and inconsistent trials 
reached statistical significance, F(1, 14) = 52.519, p < .0001, η
p
2 = .9, but all 
other main and interaction effects did not (all ps > .15). Test-order and test-
exposure variables were thus removed from all subsequent analyses.
Table 2
Overall Adjusted Mean Latencies and Standard Errors in Each Condition for 
Each Test Block
Test order
IRAP test type per block
Consistent Inconsistent
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
Consistent 
first 2,279 100 2,295 84 2,221 115 2,516 105 2,537 101 2,492 132
Inconsistent 
first 2,224 133 2,127 154 2,155 148 2,407 115 2,532 119 2,406 131
Individual Pairs Analyses
The mean response latencies for each participant for consistent and 
inconsistent trials were calculated for each of the three target pairs (see 
Table 3). For each pair, response latencies were shorter for consistent 
relative to inconsistent trials. A 2 × 3 ANOVA was conducted with test type 
(consistent vs. inconsistent) and target pair (1–3) as repeated measures. 
Ignoring the previously reported main effect for test type, the effect for 
target pair was significant, F(2, 28) = 47.533, p < .0001, η
p
2 = .8, as was the 
interaction, F(2, 28) = 5.746, p = .008, η
p
2 = .3. Three separate ANOVAs were 
used to analyze consistent versus inconsistent latency differences for each 
pair. In each case, the difference proved to be significant (all ps < .0001, 
all η
p
2 > .7). Overall, therefore, each target pair produced the predicted 
IRAP effect. 
Table 3. 
Overall Mean Latencies and Standard Errors for Consistent and Inconsistent 
Trials for Each Target Pair in Experiment 1 
Target pair IRAP test type M SE
Irish–Scottish
Consistent 2,024 85
Inconsistent 2,387 83
Scottish–American
Consistent 2,297 88
Inconsistent 2,540 74
American–African
Consistent 2,328 85
Inconsistent 2,567 79
Explicit–Implicit Correlations
To conduct correlational analyses of the IRAP and self-report data, we 
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calculated difference scores for each of the three pairs for each measure. For 
the IRAP data, this involved subtracting each participant’s mean latency score 
for consistent trials from that for inconsistent trials for each pair. For the 
likert data, each participant’s rating for Scottish was subtracted from Irish, 
and similarly for American from Scottish, and African from American. Two of 
the three Spearman rank correlations were nonsignificant, although the effect 
for the American–African pair was negative (Irish–Scottish, r
s
 = .208, p = .64; 
American–African, r
s
 = –.35, p = .13). In contrast, the Scottish–American pair 
yielded a strong positive correlation between the IRAP and likert measures 
(r
s
 = .7, p = .006). 
Trial-Type Analyses
To explore any trial-type effects, the response latency data for 
each participant were calculated for each trial type for consistent and 
inconsistent trials (see Table 4). The data were subjected to a 2 × 2 × 2 
ANOVA, with sample, target type, and consistent versus inconsistent as 
repeated measures. The primary purpose of this analysis was to determine 
if IRAP test type (consistent vs. inconsistent) interacted with either of the 
other two variables (sample and target type), but it did not (all ps > .12). In 
fact, apart from the significant main effect for test type (recorded by the 
previous ANOVAs), the only significant result was a main effect for sample, 
F(1, 14) = 34.845, p < .0001, η
p
2 = .7. This result indicates that participants 
responded more quickly on trials that presented “More likeable” than trials 
that presented “less likeable” (M = 2,315 ms, SE = 44, and M = 2,484 ms, 
SE = 43, respectively).
Table 4. 
Overall Mean Latencies and Standard Errors for Each Trial Type for Consistent 
and Inconsistent Trials 
Sample Target
IRAP 
test type M SE
Less Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Consistent 2,341 86
Less Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Inconsistent 2,611 80
Less Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Consistent 2,418 88
Less Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Inconsistent 2,567 78
More Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Consistent 2,193 85
More Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Inconsistent 2,453 83
More Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Consistent 2,136 73
More Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Inconsistent 2,479 83
The IRAP data from Experiment 1 were in accordance with the pattern of 
preferences predicted by perceived social similarity—participants responded 
more quickly when confirming preferences for Irish over Scottish, Scottish 
over American, and American over African than when confirming the opposite 
pattern of preferences. Interestingly, the preferences obtained on the likert 
scales diverged from the IRAP in two ways: No differential preference was 
shown between Irish and Scottish, and Africans were preferred to Americans.
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Experiment 2
Although the pattern of preferences obtained from the IRAP in 
Experiment 1 was in accordance with predictions, this was the first study to 
produce such an effect, and it was obtained with only one specific sample of 
participants. In Experiment 2, therefore, we made another set of predictions, 
again based on perceived social similarity, but using a non-Irish sample. 
Pilot work had shown that Irish American individuals, given a choice among 
Irish, Scottish, and African, typically rated Irish as most similar to American, 
with Scottish ranked next, followed by African. Based on this ranking it 
was predicted that Irish American participants might show a preference for 
American over Irish, Irish over Scottish, and Scottish over African. An IRAP 
and likert measures, similar to those employed in Experiment 1, were used to 
test these predictions.
Method
Participants
Sixteen individuals, 5 male and 11 female, who were citizens of the 
United States of America, and who self-identified as “Irish American,” agreed 
to participate in Experiment 2. Ages ranged from 18 to 35 years (M = 23 years). 
Eight participants each were assigned randomly to the consistent-relations-
first or inconsistent-relations-first condition.
Setting
The setting used in Experiment 1 was also employed in Experiment 2. 
Apparatus and Materials
The four likert scales employed in Experiment 1 were also employed 
in Experiment 2. The IRAP software employed in Experiment 1 was used in 
Experiment 2, but the target stimuli were different. Specifically, the six target 
word pairs presented were American–Irish, Irish–Scottish and Scottish–African, 
and their reversed counterparts (see Table 5). 
Table 5
IRAP Stimuli in Experiment 2 
Sample 1
More Likeable
Sample 2
Less Likeable
Response option 1
True
Response option 2
False
Targets deemed consistent with 
Sample 1 
American   Irish
Irish   Scottish
Scottish   African
Targets deemed consistent with 
Sample 2
Irish   American
Scottish   Irish
African   Scottish
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1.
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Results
Explicit Likert Analyses
A mean likert rating for each of the four social groups was calculated 
across the 16 participants (American, M = 3.5, SE = .376; Irish, M = 4.438, 
SE = .223; Scottish, M = 3.313, SE = .445; African, M = 3.188, SE = .277). Irish 
was rated as more likeable than any other group, with American, Scottish, 
and African rated as almost equally likeable. The four ratings from each 
participant were entered into a one-way repeated measures ANOVA, which 
yielded a significant result, F(15, 3) = 4.071, p = .0122, η
p
2 = .2. Post hoc Fisher’s 
PlSD tests indicated that the ratings for Irish were significantly different from 
the ratings for every other social group (ps < .007). All other comparisons 
were nonsignificant (ps > .4). This pattern of preferences was not consistent 
with the prediction made in terms of perceived group similarity, in that 
(a) Irish American participants did not rate American as more likeable than 
Irish, and (b) no significant differences were found among the likeability 
ratings for American, Scottish, and African. 
IRAP Preliminary Analyses
Greenwald et al.’s (2003) adapted C4 algorithm was again applied to the 
IRAP data. The same preliminary analyses were conducted as in Experiment 1. 
The overall means and standard errors calculated across participants are 
presented in Table 6. Once again, the mean response latencies, within each 
pair of test blocks, were consistently shorter for the consistent relative to the 
inconsistent trials.
Table 6 
Overall Adjusted Mean Latencies and Standard Errors in Each Condition for 
Each Test Block
Test
order
IRAP test type per block
Consistent Inconsistent
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
Consistent 
first 2,395 60 2,326 62 2,344 57 2,602 52 2,441 43 2,457 46
Inconsistent 
first 2,214 71 2,183 91 2,148 54 2,397 65 2,370 77 2,236 85
A 2 × 2 × 3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the difference 
in latencies between consistent and inconsistent trials reached statistical 
significance, F(1, 14) = 22.068, p = .0003, η
p
2 = .6. The main effect for test 
exposure also proved to be significant, F(2, 14) = 23.068, p < .001, η
p
2 = .6, with 
overall latencies reducing across exposures. Furthermore, exposure interacted 
significantly with test order, F(2, 28) = 5.947, p < .007, η
p
2 = .3, indicating that 
the differences in overall latencies between consistent- and inconsistent-first 
conditions differed across the three test exposures. Given that neither of 
these results was directly relevant to the critical IRAP effect, they were not 
subject to further analyses. 
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 Although IRAP condition did not interact significantly with any of the 
other variables, the interaction with test exposure did approach significance, 
F (2, 14) = 3.256, p = .054, η
p
2 = .2. Three follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs 
indicated that the predicted difference between consistent and inconsistent 
blocks remained significant (ps < .02) for each pair of test blocks, although 
the effect size was halved for the latter two pairs of test blocks relative to 
the first (η
p
2 = .8 vs. .4). Given that the IRAP effect was significant and in 
the predicted direction for each pair of test blocks, and the interaction only 
approached significance and had not been observed in Experiment 1, test 
exposure was removed from subsequent analyses.
Individual Pairs Analyses
The mean response latencies for each participant for consistent and 
inconsistent trials were calculated for each of the three target pairs (see 
Table 7). For each pair, response latencies were shorter for consistent relative 
to inconsistent trials. A 2 × 3 ANOVA was conducted with test type (consistent 
vs. inconsistent) and target pair (1–3) as repeated measures. Ignoring the 
previously reported main effect for test type, the effect for target pair was 
significant, F(2, 30) = 23.788, p < .0001, η
p
2 = .6. Three separate ANOVAs 
were used to analyze consistent versus inconsistent latency differences for 
each pair. In each case, the difference proved to be significant (all ps < .008). 
Overall, therefore, each target pair produced the predicted IRAP effect. 
Table 7 
Overall Mean Latencies and Standard Errors for Consistent and Inconsistent 
Trials for Each Target Pair in Experiment 2 
Target pair IRAP test type M SE
American–Irish
Consistent 2,118 61
Inconsistent 2,257 59
Irish–Scottish
Consistent 2,340 56
Inconsistent 2,519 33
Scottish–African
Consistent 2,346 58
Inconsistent 2,463 61
Explicit–Implicit Correlations
For the IRAP data, each participant’s mean latency score for consistent 
trials was subtracted from that for inconsistent trials for each pair. For the 
likert data, each participant’s rating for Irish was subtracted from American, 
and, similarly, Scottish from Irish and African from Scottish. All of the three 
Spearman rank correlations were nonsignificant, although the effects for 
the American–Irish and Irish–Scottish pairs were negative (American–Irish, 
r
s
 = –.209, p = .42; Irish–Scottish, r
s
 = –.19, p = .47; and Scottish–African, 
r
s
 = .271, p = .29). 
Trial-Type Analyses
Similar to Experiment 1, the trial-type data were subjected to a 2 × 2 × 2 
ANOVA (see Table 8), with sample, target type, and consistent versus 
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inconsistent as repeated measures. The effect for IRAP test type (consistent 
vs. inconsistent) did not interact with either of the other two variables (all 
ps > .2). Also similar to Experiment 1, a main effect for sample was recorded, 
F(1, 15) = 54.246, p < .0001, η
p
2 = .8, indicating that participants responded 
more quickly on “More likeable” than “less likeable” trials (M = 2,267 ms, 
SE = 34, and M = 2,420 ms, SE = 27, respectively). 
Table 8 
Overall Mean Latencies and Standard Errors for Each Trial Type for Consistent 
and Inconsistent Trials 
Sample Target
IRAP 
test type M SE
Less Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Consistent 2,305 73
Less Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Inconsistent 2,466 45
Less Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Consistent 2,415 47
Less Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Inconsistent 2,491 36
More Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Consistent 2,187 62
More Likeable Less Likeable to More Likeable Inconsistent 2,367 72
More Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Consistent 2,158 63
More Likeable More Likeable to Less Likeable Inconsistent 2,356 60
Conclusions
The IRAP data from Experiment 2 were again in accordance with the 
pattern of preferences predicted by perceived social similarity, thus diverging 
from the preferences obtained on the likert scales.
General Discussion
The IRAP data from Experiments 1 and 2 were in accordance with the 
pattern of preferences predicted by perceived social similarity. In comparing 
the ratings obtained from the likert scales with the IRAP results, it is clear 
that the two measures diverged. The pattern of preferences obtained in 
Experiment 1 from the likert measures indicated that participants did not 
discriminate between Irish and Scottish; and, furthermore, African was 
rated as significantly more likeable than American (the IRAP showed a bias 
for Irish over Scottish and American over African). In Experiment 2, the 
pattern of preferences obtained from the likert measures indicated that 
Irish was rated as significantly more likeable than any other group; and, 
furthermore, participants did not discriminate between American, Scottish, 
and African (the IRAP showed an American-over-Irish-over-Scottish-over-
African pattern of biases). Finally, all but one of the correlational analyses 
between the IRAP and likert measures were nonsignificant. Furthermore, 
the divergence between the two measures occurred even though one 
measure was presented immediately after the other, thus allowing for 
possible carry-over effects. The current findings therefore provide an 
example of the classic separation between an explicit and an implicit 
measure of a socially or politically sensitive attitude or belief (De Houwer, 
2002, 2006; Nosek et al., 2006). 
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As explained in the Introduction, the predictions for the IRAP perfor-
mances were based on the structural similarity between the IAT and IRAP. 
The current findings therefore support the conclusion that the IRAP effect is 
based, at least to some degree, on manipulating relevant S-R compatibility. In 
drawing this conclusion, however, it seems important to propose a possible 
explanation, at the level of psychological process, of the IRAP effect itself. 
Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006) provided one possible explanation as follows. Each 
trial of the IRAP presents a target stimulus with contextual cues that specify 
particular relational (e.g., same vs. opposite) and functional (e.g. pleasant vs. 
unpleasant) dimensions, which produces an immediate relational response 
before the participant actually presses a response key (the participant may or 
may not be consciously aware of this response). It is assumed that the prob-
ability of the initial response will be determined by the verbal and nonverbal 
history of the participant and current contextual variables. By definition, the 
most probable immediate response will be emitted first most often, and thus, 
during a consistent IRAP trial, that response will tend to match the correct 
key; during an inconsistent trial, however, the probability of such a match will 
be reduced. Thus, across multiple trials, the average latency for inconsistent 
blocks will be longer than for consistent blocks. In short, the IRAP effect is 
based on immediate and perhaps unconscious relational responding, which 
is made apparent to the researcher when the behavioral system is put under 
pressure to respond quickly and accurately.
Why did the IRAP and likert measures diverge in the current study? 
Although any response to this question must remain quite speculative, it 
seems likely that responses to the likert scales were influenced to some 
degree by variables that extended beyond the relational or contextual 
control of likeability per se. For example, some participants in Experiment 1 
may have rated “African” more likeable than “American” because doing so 
cohered with other instances of their relational responding. Imagine, for 
example, that a participant’s deictic relations involved extended relational 
networks, such as, “I think America exploits Third World countries,” 
and actions that are generally coordinated with such networks. When 
presented with the likert scales, responding in a way that coheres with 
such networks is relatively straightforward (do not provide a rating that 
favors the “super power” over poor and oppressed nations). When exposed 
to the IRAP, however, the impact of the participant’s “politically correct” 
deictic relational responding would be much reduced because there is 
insufficient time, on a trial-by-trial basis, to engage in the additional and 
sometimes complex relational activity that serves to generate a “carefully 
considered” answer. Broadly similar explanations may be offered for other 
instances in which the IRAP and likert measures diverged. For example, 
Irish and Scottish are generally perceived to be very similar, and thus it 
is possible that some participants did not rate the former as more likeable 
than the latter because doing so might be seen as excessively parochial or 
patriotic. In this context, it is also worth noting that in Experiment 2 the 
Irish American participants rated the Irish as more likeable than the other 
three groups, but they provided these ratings in an Irish University setting 
to an Irish experimenter. In short, therefore, the IRAP effect may have 
diverged from the explicit measure because the rapid-response requirement 
significantly reduced the impact of those extended relational networks that 
may have “contaminated” the targeted relational responding (cf. Wilson, 
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lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Additional research will be needed to subject 
this interpretation to empirical analysis, but given the clear IRAP effect 
obtained in the current study, such work would appear to be worthwhile.
In conducting future research on the IRAP, it wil l be important 
to determine to what extent the IRAP may be considered a measure of 
implicit cognition. De Houwer (2006) argued recently that a measure is 
implicit if one or more of the following criteria apply: Participants (a) are 
not aware that the relevant attitude is being measured, (b) do not have 
conscious access to the attitude, or (c) have no control over the outcome 
of the measure. In the context of the current study, participants (in 
Experiments 1 and 2) were almost certainly aware that their “attitudes” 
toward the various social groups were being assessed in some manner. 
With respect to the second criterion, the extent to which the participants 
were actually aware of their relative preferences remains uncertain. That 
the IRAP effects often diverged from the explicit ratings could be taken 
to indicate that the participants were not aware. On balance, it is possible 
that participants were fully aware and simply lied about their preferences 
on the explicit measures (on the grounds of political correctness). Even if 
this was the case, however, the fact that the participants failed to produce 
politically correct responses on the IRAP indicates that the measure 
meets the third criterion (i.e., they could not control the measurement 
outcome). Indeed, recent findings from our research group indicate that 
participants possess limited control over the IRAP effect even when they 
are told how the IRAP works and are expressly instructed to produce a 
“faked” performance (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 
2007). Overall, therefore, current and previous findings show that the IRAP 
might be defined as an implicit measure according to criterion 2, and more 
certainly according to criterion 3.
Assuming that the IRAP may be used as an implicit measure, as defined 
in terms of either criterion 2 or criterion 3, it seems important to ask, What 
exactly does the IRAP provide above and beyond the IAT (and, indeed, above 
other currently available implicit measures)? De Houwer (2002) has argued 
that the IAT measures associations rather than relations among stimuli or 
events, and as such can provide only an indirect measure of beliefs: 
Greenwald et al. (1998) designed the IAT to assess the strength 
of associations between concepts in memory. One can argue that 
beliefs involve more than just associations between concepts. 
First, beliefs reflect qualified associations. For instance, the 
belief “I am a bad person” implies a special type of association 
[italics added] between the concept “self” and the concept “bad,” 
namely a directional association [italics added] which specifies 
that “bad” is a property or characteristic of “self.” IAT effects 
do not reflect the nature or directionality of an association 
between concepts [italics added], they can reflect only strength 
of association. Second, many beliefs involve several associations 
and several concepts. For instance, conditional beliefs such as 
“if I do not perform well on a task, then I am an inferior person” 
involve rather complex structures of qualified associations 
between several concepts. The IAT cannot be used to directly 
capture such complex conditional beliefs (also see de Jong et al., 
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2001, p. 111). . . . In sum, the IAT does not provide a measure of 
beliefs, nor was it designed to do so. It can only provide an index 
of associations that are assumed to be involved in certain beliefs 
and thus indirect evidence for the presence of certain beliefs. 
(pp. 117–118).
A key limitation to the IAT, therefore, is that it cannot readily assess the 
nature or directionality of an association (i.e., a relation), and, furthermore, it 
cannot be used to assess a complex structure of directional associations (i.e., 
a relational network). Indeed, the same criticism may be leveled at any implicit 
measure that relies on the putative measurement of associative strength, 
such as evaluative priming (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003b), and the Go/No Go 
Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). In contrast to mainstream 
measures, the IRAP targets specific relations among sets of stimuli by asking 
participants to respond directly to target statements concerning the actual 
attitudes or beliefs under study (e.g., are Irish more likeable than Scottish?). 
Consequently, an IRAP effect may provide a more direct measure, requiring 
less inference on behalf of the researcher, than a procedure that taps into the 
associations that are assumed to underlie a particular attitude or belief. If the 
IRAP does indeed prove to be a relatively direct measure, it would provide an 
important supplement to tests of implicit cognition that rely on associative 
assumptions.
Contrasting the IRAP with other implicit measures serves to highlight 
the way in which Relational Frame Theory differs in its approach to implicit 
cognition relative to mainstream psychology. From an RFT perspective, the 
concept of implicit cognition refers to probabilistic patterns of relational 
responding that are revealed when “contaminating” sources of contextual 
control are removed, or at least reduced, as is the case when responding 
under h igh t ime-pressure is requi red. Accord ing to mainstream 
psychology, implicit measures are often seen as tapping into “underlying” 
associative networks, which, by definition, are not directional in nature (if 
“Bad” is associated with “Insect,” “Insect” is associated with “Bad”). Indeed, 
according to some mainstream researchers, implicit cognition is almost 
completely based on these types of “simple” associations (Gawronski, 
leBel, & Peters, 2007). According to RFT, however, a variety of stimulus 
relations, or what De Houwer (2006) calls “directional associations,” 
may also be involved in implicit cognition, and the current IRAP data 
appear to support this latter view. It should be recognized, however, that 
considerable empirical work will be required to explore more fully the 
implications of the RFT view of implicit cognition and how it compares and 
contrasts with mainstream views.
Clearly, many issues remain to be addressed in the study of implicit 
cognition and in the development and refinement of procedures designed to 
reveal implicit beliefs and attitudes. For example, it has yet to be determined 
if performance on an IRAP will predict “prejudiced” behavior in the natural 
environment, and thus caution is required in concluding that implicit 
prejudice necessarily leads to discriminatory action. Nevertheless, the current 
study suggests that the IRAP may be used to reveal politically or socially 
sensitive attitudes, when comparing particular national groups, which might 
not be expressed using a typical explicit measure. 
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